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This paper focuses on the role of misinformation by firms and consu- 
mers with respect to the selling and buying of insurance. For example, 
the reader may wish to think of automobile insurance when the firms do 
not know the accident probabilities for each of their customers and 
insured individuals in turn, may misperceive the probabilities of being 
involved in an accident. 
Our point of departure is the model developed by Rothschld-Stlglitz 
which demonstrated that firms could distmguish between different types 
of risks by offering a set  of policies consisting of a premium per dollar 
and a stated amount of coverage. We will investigate two types of equili- 
brium concepts in the spirit of this model: a traditional Nash egu i l ib r tum 
where each firm determines the set of policies it will offer under the 
assumption that all other firms make no changes in their offerings and a 
WiLson e~ l l i l i b rkurn  where firms look far enough ahead in the future to 
evaluate the consequences of a new policy offering on the profitability of 
current policies. 
The paper contrasts the Nash and Wilson equilibria for cases where 
consumers correctly perceive the probability of a loss as well as when 
they misperceive t h s  probability. We focus attention on the case where 
there are two risk groups in order to highlight significant differences 
between Nash and Wilson equilibria through graphical procedures. The 
final portion of the paper generalizes the results to n risk groups and 
discusses the welfare implications of consumer misperc eptions. 
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MISINFORMATION AND EQUILIBRIUM 
IN INSURANCE YlARKETS 
Paul Kleindorfer and Howard ~ u n r e u t h e r l  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with the role of misinformation by firms and 
consumers with respect to the selling and buying of insurance. Our 
interest is in the relationship between the accuracy of consumer beliefs 
and the relative performance of the market system and social programs. 
Such an investigation requires us to determine under what conditions a 
stable market equilibrium exists and, if it does, what type of insurance 
policies are offered to consumers. We can then contrast these market 
outcomes with premium regulation or some form of required insurance 
'The research in this paper i s  supported in part by the Bundesministerium fuer Forschung 
und Tecbnologie, F.R.G., contract no. 321/75Ql/RGB 8001. While support for this work is 
gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the authors' and not necessarily shared by 
the sponsor. The authors would also Like t o  express their appreciation to Uday Apte for his 
computational assistance and to Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz, and the participants 
in the  Conference on the Economics of Regulation in Berlin, for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
coverage. 
There are two reasons we are focusing on consumer misinformation 
in t h s  paper. First, there is considerable evidence from recent labora- 
tory experiments and field survey data that in&viduals systematically 
misestimate probabilities particularly when they are relatively low, the 
type of situation where insurance is most relevant (see Kunreuther et  al. 
1870; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1970). Secondly, economists have 
focused almost entirely on firm misinformation and implicitly assumed 
that consumer misperception only affects individuals adversely but has 
little impact on market behavior. 
The results of our analysis suggest that this may not be the case. We 
show that the existence and efficiency of competitive insurance markets 
can be affected by consumer (mis)perceptions of the risks that are being 
insured against. For example, we show that underestimation of the pro- 
bability of insurable events by hlgh-risk individuals may adversely affect 
the existence of competitive equilibrium. 
The paper is in the spirit of recent work in economics which deals 
with accuracy and asymmetries in information between the consumer 
and the firm where insurance is used as a prototype example (see Arrow 
1963; Williamson 1975). If the consumer knows more about h s  risk than 
the supplier, then problems of adverse selection may result where only 
the hghest risk group is offered coverage unless special steps are taken 
by the insurer. Such adverse selection problems brought on by insurers' 
lack of information on customer characteristics will be one feature of the 
model developed below. Our specific interest is to determine what addi- 
tional problems consumer misperceptions may cause in such a world. 
As an example, the reader may wish to think of automobile insurance 
under conditions where firms do not know the accident probabilities for 
each of their customers. Alternatively, firms may be prevented by law 
from using information (e.g., geographic location) which would properly 
classify customers according to their respective risk class. Customers, in 
turn, may misperceive their probabilities of being involved in an accident. 
Under these conditions, and assuming free entry and exit (no fixed costs) 
of insurance firms into this market, we are interested in determining 
what sort of policies, if any, would be marketed in the absence of regula- 
tion. 
Rothschld and Stiglitz (1976) suggest an ingenious way to overcome 
the adverse selection problem. Rather than specifying a premium rate 
per dollar, firms would offer a set of policies t<pj, Qj>l j =1 ,2  ,..., J ] ,  con- 
sist- of a premium per dollar (p j )  and a stated amount of coverage 
2 (Qj). In t h s  way the rate could differ between hlgh and low coverage. 
Given this system of insurance they investigate under what situations a 
stable (Nash) competitive equilibrium exists. One of the most important 
results of their analysis is that there cannot be a pooled equilibrium (i.e., 
a single market-wide policy) which is stable. In the case of two risk 
groups, an equilibrium, if it exists, consists of two separate policies with 
different premiums and different stated coverage. Wilson (1977) indepen- 
dently investigated the same problem as Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(hereafter referred to as R-S), but utilized a different definition of equ~li- 
briurn which involved some foresight on the part of firms. 
'The results derived below also hold if the Qj are interpreted as maximum or minimum COY- 
erage limits and are allowed to vary according to the premium. 
The contrast between the two types of equilibrium is instructive. In a 
traditional Nash equilibrium, each firm (including potential entrants) is 
assumed to determine the set of policies i t  will offer under the assump- 
tion that all other firms make no changes in their current offerings. Each 
policy is on the actuarially fair odds line so that no firm can enter the 
market and make a profit by offering a policy to either hlgh- or low-risk 
group. In the Wilson equilibrium each firm determines its optimal set  of 
policy offerings under the assumption that any currently marketed poli- 
cies which become unprofitable as a result of new offerings will no longer 
be offered in the market place. Thus, an equilibrium in Wilson's sense 
requires that firms look ahead far enough to evaluate the consequences 
of new policy offerings on the profitability of all currently marketed poli- 
cies. Clearly, it would be empirically and theoretically of interest to 
determine when the Wilson assumptions on firm behavior are justified. In 
t h s  paper, however, we shall simply analyze the implications of the Nash 
and Wilson assumptions when consumer misperceptions are present. This 
is intended as a prelude to an empirical study of other aspects of firm 
and consumer decision processes in insurance markets (see, e.g.,  Klein- 
dorfer and Kunreuther 1981, and Finsinger 1981 in this regard). 
Miyasaki (1977) has studied the Wilson equilibrium in detail. When 
there are two risk classes, a hlgh- and a low-risk group, the Miyasaki 
results imply that the Wilson equilibrium will not be a pooled equilibrium, 
as  R-S and Wilson had both originally, but erroneously, thought. Rather it 
will consist of a pair of contracts, one directed toward the hgh-risk and 
the other dlrected toward the low-risk individuals. This is just the same 
as for the Nash equilibrium, which (for this case with two risk groups) also 
consists of a pair of policies whenever it exists. Indeed, whenever the 
separating Kash equilibrium exists, it coincides with the Wilson equili- 
brium and all consumers pay actuarially fair premia. When the Nash 
separating equilibrium fails to exist, however, the Wilson equilibrium will 
still exist, but it will now entail a pair of insurance policies being mark- 
eted such that low-risk individuals will subsidize Uh- r i sk  persons. 
Miyazaki's work is related to labor market theory where firms could 
not distinguish between high productivity (i.e., low risk) and low produc- 
tivity (i.e., b g h  risk) workers. Spence (1978) translated Miyasaki's model 
to the insurance market context and generalized the model to accommo- 
date n different groups. His analysis provides a parsimonious mathemat- 
ical framework for analyzing the existence of Nash-Wilson equilibria and 
the associated cross-subsidization issues involved. More recently Ddhlby 
(1980) provided a graphical procedure for determining Nash-Wilson equili- 
bria and for analyzing the degree of subsidy whch the low risk group pro- 
vides to the high-risk group in equilibrium. Our discussion of the charac- 
teristics of an equilibrium will build on these three papers, (henceforth 
referred to  as M-S-D). None of these studies investigated the implica- 
tions of. consumer misperceptions on market stability and welfare. 
There is an underlying rationale in back of equilibrium analysis whch 
enables us to generalize the above stu&es to the case where there are n 
different risk groups and withn each group there may be multiple sub- 
groups havlng different misperceptions of the probability of a loss. This 
rationale consists of two very simple principles: first, existing firms must 
offer policies yielding zero expected profits and which maximize the per- 
ceived expected utility of the lowest risk group over all feasible (i.e., 
zero-profit) sets of policies. In addition, they must choose policies whch 
prevent new firms from entering and making positive profits. 
In the case of a Nash equilibrium, where there is no foresight by 
existing firms, all equilibrium policies must be actuarially fair, whether or 
not consumers misperceive the probabilities of risks. As we shall see, the 
region of stability will be determined by the perceived expected utility of 
individuals, in each of the different risk classes. For the case of a Wilson 
equilibrium, where firms are assumed to have a special type of foresight, 
optimal policies are determined by the perceived expected utility of indi- 
viduals. The degree of cross-subsidization between individuals will thus be 
a function of the misperceptions of the probabilities of a loss. We will 
illustrate how these two basic principles of a stable equilibrium apply to 
each of the cases discussed in the paper. 
For ease of exposition and graphcal convenience we develop our 
analysis in Sections 11-IV by assuming that there are only two risk 
classes-hgh and low-each of whom face the same loss x . ~  Section I1 
spells out the appropriate definitions and assumptions. We then briefly 
review in Section 111 the case where consumers have correct perceptions 
of the probability of a loss, in order to contrast the Nash and Wilson 
equilibria. These results also serve as a useful benchmark for investigat- 
ing the problem of consumer misperceptions in Section IV. Generaliza- 
tions of these results to n risk groups and their welfare implications are 
discussed in Section V. 
3 ~ n e  analyses by R-S, Wilson, Miyasaki and Dahlby all make these same assumptions. 
Our simplified world consists of N consumers &vided into high ( H )  
and low ( L )  risk groups of sizes N H  and N L  respectively. Each consumer 
faces a risk involving a potential loss (X) which he correctly estimates. 4 
Each group i = H ,  L  has their own perception of the probability of a loss 
( p i )  which may &ffer from the true probability (Gi).  Neither X nor the pi 
can be Influenced by consumer actions, so moral hazard problems do not 
exist. The initial wealth of consumers in the hlgh and low-risk groups is 
given by WH and WL respectively. Unless otherwise specified we assume 
WH = WL = W .  If a loss does not occur, then the wealth level of group i is 
given by W 1 ;  a loss results in wealth level of W2. An uninsured individual 
in group i with perfect information on the probability of X thus faces a 
lottery yieldmg outcomes W 1  = Wi and W 2  = W, - X with probabilities 
1 - pi and pi respectively. 
The insurance industry consists of n identical firms which offer dif- 
ferent insurance policies to consumers. Each firm is unable to distin- 
guish between low and h h - r i s k  consumers who express an interest in 
purchasing insurance. Since we are interested in the stability conditions 
of equilibrium i t  is irrelevant whether firms have a correct perception of 
Qi . Equilibrium insurance policies reflect the condition of zero expected 
profits for each firm, so that the true probabilities of a loss will reveal 
themselves through a long-run adjustment policy.5 Each policy j consists 
''The case where consumers misestimate X is also discussed briefly below and turns out to 
be analogous t o  the case where consumers misestimate a .  We thank Robert Willig for raising ibis point. 
Firms' possible rnisperceptions of probabilities (or losses) do become important in analyz- 
ing the dynamics of the industrg adjustment process in attaining equilibrium. 
of a premium per dollar ( p j )  and a specified amount of coverage ( Q j )  
which we denote by < p j ,  Qj >. If a policy is only offered to group i 
because the firm can differentiate between consumers, then it is denoted 
by < p j .  Q: >. We are assuming that  consumers a re  not allowed to pur- 
6 chase more than X dollars of insurance and that  claims are  monitored 
to eniorce t h s  restriction. A consumer in group i selects from among the  
insurance policies offered h m  the one whch  maximizes his expected util- 
ity [ E  ( U i ) ]  where U, is a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function. We 
assume U; > 0,  u;' <O so consumers are risk averse. If a person chooses 
policy < p j  Qj > based on the perceived probability p i ,  then his e z  ante 
perceived utility is 
In measuring consumer welfare, we will be careful to  distinguish 
between perceived and actual welfare, depending on whether pi or Gi is 
used in computing E  [ui] in ( 1 ) .  
The primary interest of this study is on the  impact of imperfect 
information on the stability of equilibrium and the welfare implications of 
alternative regulatory measures. In the next sections we will address the  
following questions with respect t o  the case where consumers correctly 
estimate Gi and the  case where they misperceive these probabilities (i.e., 
Pi# Q i ) :  
'~hs assumption is not critical for our analysis. For example, if consumers estimate 
QH > GH and firms offer actuarially fair premiums then consumers will purchase QH > X 
if such a policy were offered. 
1. What are the relevant conditions with respect to (a) true and 
perceived probabilities of a loss and (b) number of consumers in 
the high and low risk groups which lead to a stable Nash Equili- 
br ium? 
2. What are the characteristics of a Wilson equilibrium and how 
does it compare to a Nash equilibrium if it exists? 
3. What are the welfare implications of consumer misperceptions 
as these impact on own-group welfare and on other-group wel- 
fare a t  the market (Nash-Wilson) equilibrium? 
Ill. CORRECT PERCEPTIONS BY CONSUMERS 
Our analysis of resulting equilibrium with correct and incorrect per- 
ceptions of Q by consumers will parallel the graphical methods intro- 
duced by R-S. They note that the implications of any insurance policies 
offered in the market can be reflected by their impact on consumer 
wealth in the two relevant states: no loss and loss. Denote by ( W1,  Wz) 
consumer wealth in these two states respectively. If < p ,  Q > were an 
insurance policy offered to either consumer group, then the representa- 
tion of this policy in ( W1, Wz) space is seen from (1) to be: 
W i = W - p Q  and W z = w - x + ( 1 - p ) ~  . (2) 
Similarly, any pojnt in ( W1, W2) space corresponds to an insurance policy 
which might be marketed. Consumer decisions regarding the choice 
betwe en insurance policies will be determined by maximizing their 
- 1 0 -  
expected utility, so that the traditional iso-utility curve analysis applies. 
PROPERTIES OF A NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
Since firms cannot &fferentiate between high and low-risk consu- 
mers, then adverse selection problems may arise and a market equili- 
brium may or may not exist. R-S first show that no single policy (i.e., 
pooled) equilibrium can exist. They then discuss conditions under which 
a separating Nash equilibrium, consisting of two policies < p ~ ,  QH > and 
< p ~ ,  QL >, can exist. Two conditions are necessary. First, hgh-risk con- 
sumers must be offered full insurance at  actuarial rates < Q H ,  X >; 
second, low-risk consumers must be offered an actuarially fair policy 
< (PL, QL > whose utility to the bgh-risk consumers is identical to the pol- 
icy < QH, X >. In t h s  case there is no incentive for the hgh-risk group to 
purchase a low-risk policy (which would create negative profits for firms). 
The resulting (potential) equilibrium is shown as a ~ ,  at in Figure 1. 
These conditions are equivalent to having the firm maximize expected 
utility of the low-risk consumer whle ensuring that there is no incentive 
for a high risk individual to buy a policy offered to a low-risk consumer. 
Hence, they conform to the basic principles for an equilibrium outlined in 
Section I .  To see whether aH, at is actually a stable Nash equilibrium, we 
must consider whether new entrants can make a positive profit if all firms 
continue to offer the above two policies. We first construct the market 
fair odds for pooled policies (i.e., EF in Figure 1). Since there are NH and 
Figure 1: Nash equilibrium. 
NL consumers in each risk class, the slope of t h s  line is given by 
- ( 1  - @)/ @, where 
and R = N L /  N H .  We then determine whether the iso-utility line, U L ,  
whch  passes through a ~  allows a point such as y in Figure 1 above it and 
below the fair market  odds line. If such a point exists, some enterprising 
new firm will make positive profits by offering this policy to consumers. 
This point is preferred by all consumers t o  both a H  and a L .  Whether or 
not such a point exists depends on the ratio of low to  high-risk consumers 
in the market (i.e., on R in ( 3 ) ) .  As R decreases, the market odds line EF 
moves in the direction of EH and the  area of instability decreases. Of 
interest is the maximal R ,  denoted by R', for whch the separating equili- 
brium a ~ ,  a L  is stable. In Figure 1 this would be the R corresponding to  
the  market fair odds line EF' which is tangent to UL . 
To se t  the stage for our analysis of equilibrium when consumers have 
imperfect information and as a matter  of interest in its own right, we con- 
sider a few examples illustrating how R * varies as objective data changes. 
To be concrete we use the exponential utdity function, although the quali- 
tative results given are  more general. 
In Figure 2 we depict iso-R' contours as  a function of and eL  
when X = 500, W = 1000, and Ui( tu )  = - exp ( - C i w )  with CH = CL = .01. 
Several points regarding the figure are  worth noting. As the value of 9 ~  
increases, the maximum value R *  a t  whch  the Nash equilibrium is stable 
decreases. For example, if aH = .05 and a L  = .O1 then R' = 2.59; when 
Figure  2 :  E f f e c t s  of Qi on s t a b i l i t y .  
QH = -05 and aL = ,03 then R* decreases to .63. The same pattern occurs 
along any ray f ( Q H ,  aL) /  aH = t Q L ,  t > I{. 
For GH the situation is a bit more complicated. For any given iPL the 
value of R* increases to a critical value as aH increases and thereafter 
R* decreases. The analysis of Figure 2 thus operationalizes the conjec- 
tures of R-S concerning the effects of Qi on the stability of equilibrium, 
while at  the same time demonstrating that no simple conclusions regard- 
ing differences between iPH and iPL and resulting stability emerge. 
Changes in risk aversion also affect stability. As the consumer 
becomes more risk averse he is willing to give up more W I  for the same 
increase in W2. Thus as the hgh-risk consumer becomes more risk 
averse the curve UH becomes less steep so that aL moves up on the fair 
odds line EL in Figure 1. This increases the region of stability. On the 
other hand, an increase in CL causes VL to become less steep which 
decreases the region of stability. A similar analysis can be undertaken 
with respect to the affect of changes in the loss X on stability. Higher 
losses reduce stability because the uninsured point E in Figure 1 is 
shifted downward with consequent downward shifts in c t ~  and a L .  
PROPERTIES OF A WILSON EQUILIBRIUM 
When a separating, Nash equilibrium does not exist, one may argue 
(as do Rothschild-Stglitz) that the market is likely to fail in the absence 
of regulation. Alternatively, one may proceed as in Wilson (1 977) and 
Spence (1978) to analyze competitive equilibrium by assuming a stronger 
equihbriurn concept, one which attributes foresight and restraint to 
firms. Such assumptions raise a number of empirical questions which we 
will not pursue here. We will simply point out the implications of these 
alternative Nash-Wilson assumptions for the resulting market adjustment 
processes and equilibria. 
In a traditional Nash equilibrium, each firm (including potential 
entrants) is assumed to determine the set of policies by maximizing its 
expected profits under the assumption that all other firms make no 
changes in their current offerings. In the Wilson equilibrium, each firm 
determines its optimal set of policy offerings under the assumption that 
any currently marketed policies which become unprofitable as a result of 
their new offerings will no longer be offered in the marketplace. Clearly, 
if a Nash equilibrium exists it is also a Wilson equilibrium. 
Flgure 3 depicts a case where a stable separating (Nash) equilibrium 
does not exist. A Wilson equilibrium will, nonetheless, always exist for this 
case (as Miyasaki, 1977, proved). Following Dahlby (IQBO), the con- 
struction of the Wilson equilibrium proceeds as follows. First, the dotted 
line CD in the Flgure is constructed as follows. To each point on BD, like 
X, the unique point Y on the high-risk iso-utility contour UA passing 
through X is determined for which the policies X and Y together achieve 
zero profits when the Qh- r i sk  consumers buy X and the low-risk consu- 
mers buy Y. Thus, the dotted line CD is the locus of low-risk policies 
necessary to  achieve zero profits if hgh-risk consumers are offered full 
insurance. It can then be verified (see Spence 1978) that the Wilson 
equilibrium is the pair of policies au = ( R E ,  af), illustrated in Figure 3, 
where the low-risk consumer maximizes his expected utility along CD. 
Figure 3: Wilson equilibrium. 
The logic establishng that au is indeed a Wilson equilibrium is that the 
only way for a firm to possibly make profits on a policy deviating from aa 
is if all remaining firms continue to offer au, suffering losses in the pro- 
cess. Given the Wilson assumptions, the devlant policy would never be 
offered in the first place. The resulting equilibrium aa turns out to be 
unique (see M-S-D). As is apparent from Figure 3, a Wilson equilibrium 
always involves subsidies from low-risk to high-risk consumers whenever 
it does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium. 
IV. WSPERCEPTIONS BY CONSUMERS 
In this section we will develop equilibrium results for the case where 
consumers misperceive the probability of a loss, assuming it to be 
y i  # Qi. To motivate the analysis and to provide a contrast with the pre- 
vious section we will first look a t  the case where firms have perfect 
knowledge of the risk facing each of their customers so that they do not 
have adverse selection problems and a Nash equilibrium exists. We will 
then turn to the case where firms cannot distinguish between h g h  and 
low-risk customers, still maintaining the assumption that either or both 
groups of insured misperceives the probability of a loss. 
PERFECT INFORMATION BY FIRMS 
Suppose consumers misperceive Q I i ,  believing it to be p i ;  firms con- 
tinue to have perfect information on Q I i .  Hence the consumer's iso-utility 
curves are based on p i  instead of Q l i .  Two cases are possible: either 
pi > Q I i  or pi < a i .  We depict both of these situations in Figure 4. Let us 
concentrate first on the hlgh risk group. Suppose that a consumer esti- 
mates p ~  = p), > a H .  He is then willing to purchase full insurance (e.g., 
the policy A) at  more than the actuarially fair price as shown by the per- 
ceived iso-utility curve u;. This curve is tangent to the consumer's per- 
ceived odds line. EH, .  whlch is below EH because p ~  > @ H . 7  Firms offer- 
ing the policy X would make positive profits, thus inducing entry by oth- 
ers at  a lower premium. Price will continue to fall until it  reaches an 
equilibrium a t  a~ 
If consumers underestimate the risk so that p H  = p i  < Q H  their per- 
ceived odds line, E H 2 ,  is above E H .  They will only want to purchase full 
coverage if pH = p H  < a H .  Firms offering such a policy will thus lose 
money, so that equilibrium will be established at the point where the 
consumer's perceived iso-utility curve, u;, is tangent to the objective fair 
odds line E H .  This point afi indicates that the resulting market equili- 
brium will provide a policy with less than full coverage when firms have 
perfect information and consumers underestimate i P H .  The analogous 
situation holds for low-risk consumers who underestimate their risk as 
7heutf i ty  contours of the perceived utility function 
E [ (  u)] = ( I  -p) U (  W1) + p  U (  W2) are all tangent to  the perceived fair odds line 
W 2  = -[(I-p)/ p ]  W l  + ( W / p )  -X where full cqverage occurs (i.e., where W1 = W2 . 
The proof follows by implicit difierentiation of the iso-utility contours along the ful- 
insurance line w1 = W2. 1 
Figure 4. Equilibrium under consumer misperceptions 
shown by the equilibrium point a; in Figure 4. 
To illustrate the impact of consumer misperception on equilibrium 
consider an example using an exponential function U = -be CLW where Ci 
is the risk aversion coefficient. The relevant objective data are: 
QH = .04 QH = .02 X = 500 and W = 1000 
The equilibrium insurance policies are 
if consumers have perfect information. In this case a~ and aL are 
respectively (980, 980) and (990, 990) no matter how risk averse any indi- 
vidual may be. To examine the impact of misperception on equilibrium 
values it is instructive to vary not only ( p ~  and (pL but also CH and CL. 
The following Table presents illustrative results. The first row represents 
the case where probabilities are either known perfectly or overestimated. 
The equilibrium policy is always full insurance. When probabilities are 
underestimated the equilibrium policy will deviate increasingly from full 
insurance as the consumer becomes less risk averse. For example if 
V L  = .O1 and CL = .02 then a~ =(990.7, 955.7) compared with 
aH = (991.4, 921.4) when CL = .01. 
We close this section by noting that the above analysis goes through 
unchanged if consumers also misestimate the magnitude of the loss X. In 
this case, their estimate of X, say 4 for group i, replaces X in equation 
(1) in computing perceived expected utility. Under- (0ver)estimates of X 
then have the same effect on perceived iso-expected utility contours and 
resulting market equilibrium as under-(0ver)estimates of Q. 

IMPERFECT INFORMATION BY FIRMS 
Suppose that firms cannot distinguish between hlgh- and low-risk 
consumers, and that consumers may misperceive the probability of a 
loss. Just as we proceeded with informed firms (see Figure 4), so here too 
the only change required to incorporate consumer misperceptions into 
the analysis of the previous section is to substitute perceived for actual 
expected utility contours in the analysis. We restrict our attention here 
to misperceptions of 9 ,  although a similar analysis applies for mispercep- 
tions of X, as discussed just above. 
Nash Equilibrium 
We illustrate in Figure 5 the process for determining the Nash 
separating equilibrium if it exists. Of fundamental concern to us are the 
effects of misinformation on market stability and the resulting equili- 
brium policies. I t  is relatively s t ra~htforward to determine what impact 
deviations of pH and p L  from the true parameters will have on these 
characteristics. In the case of the high risk group we note that if 
p~ > i P H  then full coverage will be offered. Furthermore as aH increases, 
the point aL moves up the fair odds line EL and increases the region of 
stability. We illustrate these points in Flgure 5 by constructing two iso- 
utility curves u;, UZ which correspond to (PA > i P H  and (~f, < m H  respec- 
tively. If all other data remain constant, then we see that the policies 
[ah , a i ]  associated with will be stable. On the other hand, the policy 

[ a $ ,  afj  is unstable because U: is below the market fair odds line EF, 
thus enabling a new firm to enter and make positive profits in the short- 
run. Note that we can generate similar affects on stability by changing 
the hlgh-risk consumer's risk aversion: increasing the degree of risk aver- 
sion produces the same affect as increasmg p w  
Misperception by low-risk consumers is illustrated in Figure 6 for the 
case where p~ = I P H .  It should be noted that a~ will not be affected by 
misperception on the part  of the low-risk consumer because it is deter- 
mined solely by the hlgh-risk iso-utility curve associated with a ~ ,  in this 
case UH. If low-risk consumers overestimate I P L  (i.e., p l  > !DL) then the 
iso-utility curve is given by uJ. The curve U? represents the case where 
Cpf < I P t .  In general, the region of stability is increased as p~ decreases. 
In Figure 6 a stable s e p a r a t q  equilibrium exists when p~ = p f  but not 
when p L  = p i  > p f .  The impact of misperception of @ L  produces similar 
effects in stability as changes in risk aversion. As the consumer becomes 
more risk averse his iso-utility curve become less steep reflecting a wil- 
lingness to sacrifice more W 1  for the same amount of W2. This is similar 
to the effects just discussed for increases in p L .  
The above illustrative examples assumed that all consumers in the 
high and low-risk groups had the same misestimates of the probability. If 
there were a whole spectrum of misestimates then the procedure for 
determining whether a stable equilibrium exists is based on similar prin- 
ciples. There would be a range of policies offered to high-risk individuals 
ranging from full coverage for all those who perceive pH%@H to the lowest 
tangency of the UH curve to the fair odds line. Flgure 7 depicts the three 
W 1  
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Figure 7 r  Nash equilibrium with consumer misperceptions. 
policies a:! a?, at, for the case where two high-risk groups ( 2  and 3) 
underestimate iPH and one (group 1) correctly estimates it. There is only 
one policy for the low-risk group--a: which is determined by the intersec- 
tion of U F  with EL. This construction guarantees that every high-risk 
consumer is provided a policy which maximizes his perceived expected 
utility at  actuarial rates (i.e., along EH), and all low-risk consumers are 
offered the hghest coverage whch, at  actuarial rates (along EL), is con- 
sistent with not attracting any hgh-risk consumers to the policy intended 
for low-risk consumers. 
We thus see that low-risk individuals are penalized by those high risk 
consumers underestimating pH--they are offered less coverage than if 
they had estimated p~ = i P H .  The stability of equilibrium is determined 
by looking -at the position of the lowest  UL curve (i.e., the U L  curve 
corresponding to the minimum p L )  to the fair odds line. The situation 
least likely to lead to stability is if some hgh-risk consumers grossly 
underestimate iPH and some low-risk consumers overestimate i P L .  It 
should now be clear why stability of Nash equilibrium is so sensitive to 
perceptions of iPi by consumers. Suppose low-risk consumers estimate 
pL>>iPL and one h g h  risk consumer estimates pH<<iPH. What otherwise 
may have been a stable Nash equilibrium is now unstable. Ths observa- 
tion suggests that the existence of a Nash equilibrium can be sensitive to 
8 consumer (mis)perceptions of the risk involved . 
'of course, we assume away fixed costs of entry in this perfectly competitive model. If these 
were present, they would naturally dampen the entry threat to existing firms resulting from 
changes of the above sort, where only one (or a few) high-risk consumers' perceptions 
changed. 
Wilson Equilibrium 
As we will see, the Wilson equilibrium behaves somewhat more 
smoothly in response to consumer misperceptions. The procedure for 
determining the Wilson equilibrium set of policies parallels the one 
described above for the Nash equilibrium. In particular, if pHmi" is the 
lowest estimate of C f i H  by high-risk individuals and pLmBX is the hghest 
estimate of i P L  by low-risk individuals, then the set of optimal policies for 
all individuals is based on these two extreme groups just as in the Nash 
equilibrium case. The one critical difference between the two cases is 
that in a Nash equilibrium there are no cross-subsidies, whereas the Wil- 
son equilibrium entails such subsidies just as in the case where consumer 
perceptions are accurate. 
We restrict our attention here to deriving the Wilson equilibrium 
when there are just four groups,g denoted H I ,  H2. L  L2,  where 
Thus, groups t H 1  , L 1 ]  overestimate and groups !Hz, L,{ underestimate 
their respective accident probabilities. Our first concern will be to deter- 
mine, for any fixed level of total subsidy from low- to hgh-risk consu- 
mers, what high-risk policies can be offered in the market. Thereafter we 
analyze what level of subsidy is compatible with market equilibrium. under 
the Wilson assumptions on firm adjustment. 
'A more formal derivation for multiple sub-groups is contained in Kleindorfer and Kunreuth- 
er (1081). 
We begin by noting that if a subsidy is provided any hgh-risk group, 
then it must be provided in such a manner that the perceived expected 
utility of the group in question is maximized over all poiicies offering the 
same level of subsidy. Otherwise a new entrant could offer the group a 
policy it would prefer and whch would entail a lower subsidy. Now the set 
of all constant-subsidy policies for the h~gh-risk group is easily 
represented in ( W1 , W2) space by the transformation 
( W ,  , wz) -, ( W ,  + s, w2 + s ) ,  
where S is the subsidy involved. In Figure 8, the parallel lines So , S, , S2 
indicate sets of policies with increasing levels of subsidy to the hgh-risk 
group, where So, the zero-subsidy line, is just the fair odds line for the 
hlgh-risk group. 
The condition that  perceived expected utility be maximized for each 
high-risk sub-group along the iso-subsidy lines just derived is reflected in 
Figure 8. For group 2 this ylelds the locus L; whch is the set of policies 
obtained through the tangency of the iso-perceived utility contours to the 
iso-subsidy lines. For group 1, the maximizing policy along any iso- 
subsidy line is just the full-insurance policy since all our consumers are 
risk averse and is no smaller than QH. 
Now what we have noted above is that only policies on or ;4 5 
can be offered to groups 1 and 2 respectively. A further feasibility res- 
triction is that whatever is offered to group 2 must not be preferred by 
group 1 to the policy intended for them. For example, suppose the poli- 
cies ( A ,  , in Figure 8 were offered on the market. Clearly all of the 
h h - r i s k  consumers would prefer B2 to the policy A,.  A new entrant 
Figure 8: Constructing a Wilson equilibrium. 
could then offer the policy 7 and attract  only individuals from group 1. 
Such a new entrant would thus pay the hgh-risk group as a whole a 
smaller subsidy. Thus, if Bz  is to  be offered a t  all, competition ( to  minim- 
ize total subsidies to the high-risk group) will push the solution to the pair 
(A2 , B ~ ) .  A similar argument holds for the pair ( A ~  , B1). Note for 
(Ao , Bo), however, that the point A ; ,  if offered, would offer positive pro- 
fits, thus induc~ng entry and pushmg the solution to ( A o  , Bo). 
We see from the above discussion that  only policies (ah , a$) satisfy- 
ing the following conditions can qualify as candidates for the policies 
offered to the hgh-risk groups: first, each of the ah must belong to the 
respective perceived utility maximizing curve d f h ;  and secondly, the 
condition 
must obtain unless this implies a positive subsidy to group 1, in whch 
case group 1 is offered the actuarially fair, full-coverage policy. 
We note that  the above procedure provides us, for any pre-specified 
subsidy S to the hgh-risk group, with a unique pair of policies 
< ah (S) , a$ (S) > whch  can be marketed to these two hgh-risk 
groups. 
H a w  determined feasible policy offerings for the hgh-risk groups 
for any specified subsidy level S, we can now proceed to determine the 
amount of subsidy to the hgh-risk groups which is compatible with a Wil- 
son equilibrium. We proceed as in Figure 3 to construct a locus of low- 
risk policies whch, if purchased together with the pair 
< ah ( S )  , a8 ( S )  >, will provide a subsidy of S to the hgh-risk groups 
and are such that  no one in the high-risk group finds it attractive to  
switch to  the policy intended for the low-risk groups. Figure 9 summar- 
izes t h s  process, paralleling that described in Figure 3. As before, the 
desired locus of low-risk policies is labeled CD. Thus, the policies 
(4 , Bi , Ci), i = 0, 1, 2, are constructed so that  (a) zero profits are 
achieved and (b) a t  the level of subsidy implied for each hgh-risk group 
the utility of that group is maximized; and (c) no one prefers the policy 
intended for any other group to h s  own. 
The final piece of the Wilson equilibrium puzzle can now be put into 
place, namely the determination of the particular policy (there will only 
be one) offered to the low-risk group. Just as in Figure 3, so here also, it 
is easy to see that  the policy offered to the low-risk group must be such 
as to maximize their welfare along the zero-profits contour CD in Figure 
9. Moreover, since the low-risk group with the  hghes t  misperception will 
be the easiest to  "skim" off, it  must in fact be thls group whose perceived 
utility is maximized along CD. Putting all of this together we obtain the 
Wilson equilibrium depicted in Flgure 10 as the policy < aEfi , a i  . a~ >. 
We may note immediately that  as the  maximal overestimate of any 
low-risk group increases (i.e., as pi increases), the Wilson equilibrium 
moves up the zero profit contour CD. Thus, the policy a i  might 
correspond to the  Wilson equilibrium policy offered to all low-risk consu- 
mers if (pj were to  increase (or i f  there were another sub-group withn the 
low-risk group with higher overestimates of QL than those of sub-group 
L Thus, overestimates by any sub-group in the low-risk group costs 
W 1 
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Figure 10: Wilson equilibrium. 
everyone in the low-risk group additional taxes which flow to the hgh-risk 
group as subsidies. 
Similarly, a more pronounced underestimation by the high-risk 
group reduces the amount of coverage low-risk groups are offered in 
equilibrium. Thus, we see that information imperfections on the part of 
consumers can affect both welfare outcomes associated with market 
equilibrium as well as the nature and existence of such equilibria. 
V. GENERALIZATIONS AND WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
The graphical procedure described above for investigating stability 
of Nash equilibrium and characterizing Wilson equilibria is quite general. 
If there are n different risk groups and a range of misperceptions withn 
each one of these groups the same general principles above apply: 
(1) There can be multiple policies offered to the highest risk group 
(denoted H) depending on the extent of their misperceptions, 
(2) There is only one policy offered to the lowest risk group 
(denoted L) based on pLmBx, 
(3) All risk groups between H and L have their policies determined 
so that an individual in a higher risk group has n o  incentive to 
purchase a policy designed for a lower risk group. Naturally this 
incentive is based on perceived expected utility. 
(4) With respect to the stability of a Nash equilibrium one must 
determine whether there is any pooled policy whch is more 
attractive to adjacent paired groups than the proposed separat- 
ing policies and at the same time yields a profit to any firm 
offering such a policy. 
The above principles are studied analytically in Kleindorfer and Kun- 
reuther (1981) following the M-S-D framework. Assuming their validity for 
the moment, the following welfare implications, which we have analyzed 
here for the case of two groups, may be conjectured in general: 
(Wl) An increasing underestimation of risk by the hgher  risk groups 
reduces the amount of coverage low-risk individuals are offered 
(under either a stable Nash equilibrium or a Wilson equilibrium) 
and also reduces the (ez ante objective) expected utility of the 
resulting policy offered to low-risk individuals. 
(W2)Increasing overestimation of risk by the lower risk groups 
increases the tax paid by these low-risk people because they 
demand more insurance. 
Besides verifying W1 and W2 generally, several additional welfare and 
regulatory matters are of interest. For example, when is compulsory 
insurance a wellare-improving reg ulation?1° How is learning incorporated 
into both firms' knowledge of consumers' as well as consumers knowledge 
of the risks against which they are insuring themselves. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantIy, there is the question of the applicability of the 
price-quantity framework we have been using here. 
In contrast with the price-quantity framework, one might suppose 
that insurance policies are specified through a premium (price per dollar 
of coverage) as in Pauly (1974) and Kunreuther and Pauly (1981), where 
'Osee Dahlby (1980) for an analysis of this question when consumers are perfectly informed. 
each customer then determines the total coverage he or she will pur- 
chase at  the stated premium. The primary reason why such pricing poli- 
cies may be a better model of actual insurance markets than price- 
quantity policies was already recognized by R-S, viz. price-quantity poli- 
cies require a central monitoring system for the entire insurance indus- 
try if they are to function. I f ,  for example, a policy < p ,  Q > is offered 
with p < i P H  and Q < X, then hgh-risk consumers would buy several such 
policies (with total coverage approximating X) from different firms, thus 
undermining the intended self-selection mechanism inherent in offering 
less than full coverage. The only way to prevent t h s  is to monitor all 
(hgh-risk) consumer purchases to ensure that only one policy is pur- 
chased. Such a central monitoring system is problematical in a competi- 
tive market. Moreover, if such a monitoring system could be set  up at  low 
cost, it is also likely that, a t  little additional cost, sophsticated statistical 
techniques could be used to classify customers over time according to 
their risk class. Each customer could then be offered the socially optimal 
policy of full coverage a t  actuarial rates. 
The broader issue here is the empirical question of whch forms of 
policy are actually offered to the consumer in various insurance contexts 
as well as how firms and consumers gather and process information relat- 
ing to these policies. This issue has both institutional as well as decision 
theoretic characteristics (e.g., involving insurance agents' behavior in 
representing available pohcies). As we have seen in t h s  paper, informa- 
tional and behavioral differences resulting from the mutual interaction of 
firms and consumers have interesting implications for market equili- 
brium, regulation, and welfare. 
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